| Copyright 1998 by the |
Psychology in Spain, Vol 2 No 1, 92-99 |
| Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos |
|
Mood state and recall biases: the role of
affect. In this experiment, mood states were induced by exposure to two film clips, one
happy and another sad, without any specific verbal instruction from experimenters.
Subsequently, tests of immediate memory were performed. Subjects had to remember lists of
positive, negative or neutral words. Results show that watching films produces a reliable
and strong bias on remembering but a lesser effect on expression of mood. Moreover, verbal
affect expression and biased remembering were unrelated. These results are more favourable
to a cognitive priming hypothesis than to an affective state-dependent one.
El presente trabajo consiste en un experimento en el que se inducen estados de ánimo
mediante la exposición a unas películas (una alegre y otra triste) sin instrucciones
concretas por parte de los experimentadores y se realizaran pruebas de memoria inmediata
de listas que contenían palabras neutras, con connotaciones alegres y con connotaciones
tristes. Los resultados indican que mientras el efecto de la exposición a las películas
sobre el recuerdo de palabras fue claro y consistente, los cambios subjetivos del estado
de ánimo fueron débiles, sin que ambos efectos mostraran ningœn tipo de
correlación. Estos resultados son más favorables a la hipótesis que destaca el papel de
la preparación cognitiva que a la basada en el estado afectivo.
The original Spanish version of this paper has been
previously published in Psicothema, 1997, Vol. 9 No 2, 247-258
........... *
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jordi Fernández Castro.
Unidad de Psicología Básica. Facultad de Psicología. Apartado de Correos nº 29. Univ.
Autónoma de Barcelona. 08193 Bellaterra-Barcelona. Spain.
s early as 1968, Velten proposed a method for inducing mood
states in controlled laboratory situations, opening up a new chapter in basic research on
human emotions. The procedure used by Velten consisted in drawing up three lists of 60
sentences in the first person (i.e., self-referential). Each list had a different
emotional content: depressive, euphoric or neutral. There were three groups of subjects,
so that each group read only one of the three lists of sentences. Subsequently, all
subjects were administered various psychological tests, and it was found that this simple
procedure induced a mood state capable of producing marked differences in writing speed,
decision-making speed, word association and subjective expression of affect. The
importance of these results is due to the fact that, until now, basic research on emotions
has focused on its antecedents, especially cognitive determinants, on the analysis of
subjective experience and on physiological concomitants; but not so much on the way
emotional states alter psychological functioning.
Currently, it is accepted that a particular mood state includes not only an affective
component, that is, a subjective experience, but also a cognitive context and a general
state of the organism (Mayer,
Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufman and Blainey, 1991). However, as regards the relationships
between these different components, a variety of approaches can be found. There are those
who argue that it is thinking that produces both affective states, that is, the experience
of emotion, and behaviours associated with the emotions and all other effects derived from
them (Lazarus, 1982). Others,
like Zajonc (1980), defend the
primacy of affect over cognition.
Finally, there are intermediate propositions, such as those of Teasdale and Fogarty (1979), who
suggest a reciprocal relationship between cognition and affect, since, while some
cognitions might produce changes in mood states, these states may, in turn, affect or
alter certain cognitive processes, such as memory.
Bower (1981, 1987, 1992) made a considerable
contribution to research on the relationship between emotion and cognition, demonstrating
the influence of mood states on memory and other cognitive processes, developing new
experimental procedures, producing an important body of empirical data and formulating an
influential theory on the relationship between emotions and cognition. In one of his early
works, Bower (1981) induced a
state of happiness or sadness by means of hypnotic suggestion. While in this state
subjects had to read a story involving two characters, one a cheerful person for whom
things always turned out well, and the other a sad character for whom things always went
wrong. The following day, in a neutral mood state, subjects were asked what they
remembered of the story. The results suggest that those induced with a sad mood state
remembered the sad character, and vice-versa. This work, together with others,
demonstrated that information is selected according to its degree of congruence with
subject's mood state at the time he/she is processing it.
Similar results have been found by other research groups using somewhat different
procedures. Using Velten's method, evidence has been accumulated in support of the notion
that when a particular mood state is induced and subjects are asked to recall
autobiographical episodes, the content of these apparently free recalled memories is
consistent with the mood state induced (see Rholes, Riskind and Lane, 1987; Matthews and McLeod, 1994). Isen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1978)
found similar results using a different method. These authors presented to their subjects
a list of words with different emotional value and asked them to remember as many of them
as they could after experiencing a situation of success or failure. The words that
coincided with the mood state produced in the subject were more frequently recalled than
the incongruent ones. Also, it is well established empirically that natural depressive
episodes increase access to memories of sad episodes from the past (Matthews and McLeod, 1994).
To the above we might add the following: mood states related to happiness, sadness or
anger affect free association tasks carried out with words of neutral emotional content;
such states also bias the interpretation of ambiguous scenes and influence judgements with
respect to familiar objects and people about whom heterogeneous impressions have been
stored; and finally, they affect the subjective probability of the occurrence of future
events (see Matthews and McLeod,
1994). Furthermore, mood states can also alter expectations of self-efficacy (Kavanagh and Bower, 1985). In sum,
a great quantity of processes related to cognition that appear to determine emotions may
also be biased and influenced, in turn, by emotions themselves.
In order to explain these findings, Bower (1987, 1992)
has proposed that the way in which an experience is codified in the memory is determined,
at least partly, by the mood state of the subject at the moment of carrying out this
codification. Further, the similarity between the mood states at the time of acquisition
and at the moment of recall may also determine accessibility to memory. This would occur
through the activation of certain emotional nodules that include the physical experience
of each emotion, expressive behaviour, verbal labels and the situations that can produce
emotions. These nodules would be connected to propositional networks, so that inducing the
emotional state would also activate the whole network. Since pleasant experiences are
codified precisely when one is in a good mood, these experiences will be remembered more
easily when the subject is once more in a good mood and, conversely, sad or negative
memories will be easier to evoke when the subject is in a state of depression.
Bower's approach, as Teasdale and
Fogarty point out (1979), has diverse interpretations, and has had implications for
the development of subsequent models of the relationship between cognition and emotions.
In fact, it is a perspective that is too general and unspecific to provide concrete
predictions. The problems with this general theory of cognitive processing dependent on
mood state have become numerous, and are clearly exposed by Matthews and McLeod (1994).
At the present time, one of the questions raised concerns which characteristics of mood
states are sufficient and necessary to produce bias in the processing of information. In
this line, Rholes et al. (1987)
proposed an alternative theoretical interpretation of the phenomenon in question, and one
with some very interesting practical implications. These authors make a distinction
between two alternative explanations of the way in which mood state influences memory. The
first interpretation is based on the so-called mood
state dependent mechanism (Bower, 1981; Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979), to
which we have already referred, and which presupposes that all the elements of the
emotional nodules are activated together and are necessary for producing bias in the
processing of information. The second interpretation supports the view that the impact of
mood states is influenced mainly by the cognitions that accompany them, and not so much by
the emotional experience. This interpretation is based on studies that demonstrate that
the repeated exposition or use of a certain schema, concept or word makes any material
associated with it easier to recall. Thus, it is supposed that a situation that provokes
an emotion activates both an affect and a related cognition. This cognition may
semantically prepare or guide other processes (such as the memory of life experiences)
associated with it. In other words, it would be the cognition related with the mood state
and not the affect itself (the emotional experience) that influences selective memory (Higgins, Rholes and Jones, 1977; Higgins and King, 1980). These two
mechanisms -recall dependent upon general mood state and memory prepared only cognitively-
are, of course, not incompatible.
Rholes et al (1987)
tested both explanations, comparing the inducement of mood states using both phrases that
primed affect -that is, the subjective experience and perception of somatic changes- and
those that represented self-evaluations which made no specific reference to sensations or
experiences. Examples of the first type of sentence would be: I'm sad or My heart is heavy, and of the second, I've failed or I've made a
fool of myself. They found that both types of
sentence were capable of producing changes in mood state, but that those based on
self-evaluations had more influence on selective memory. The authors' conclusion was that
affective experience (the subjective experience produced by mood state) is not relevant to
the matters we are discussing here.
Within this line of work on induced mood states, the quest for a method that is at once
simple, easy to administer, quick, and which would induce a strong and consistent mood
state has provided the motivation for some research. The original method proposed by
Velten continues to be widely used, though hypnotic induction has also been employed with
good results (Bower, 1981; Natalie and Hantas, 1982), as we
mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, these methods have not been without their critics.
Another method, frequently used in clinical contexts, is that developed by Mosak (see Brewer, Doughtie and Lubin, 1980),
in which subjects are asked to recall events from their own lives that have been
especially sad or happy. Series of self-referential statements and autobiographical
anecdotes have in common cognitive bases as causal factors of mood states. The procedures
using one and the other approach, however, differ in that while autobiographical memories
are individual and refer to feelings as they occurred in reality, the series of
selfreferential statements are general, and refer to feelings and thoughts in hypothetical
situations.
The direct experience of failure or success has also been used to induce mood states -for
example obtaining a result higher or lower than expected in a cognitive laboratory task (Edo, 1994). Another method used
has been to have subjects listen to recorded stories that induce depressive states (Goodwin and Williams, 1982).
It would appear that, whatever the method used, it is not too difficult to obtain the
results found in the literature. The majority of procedures presented have demonstrated
their effectiveness, be it to different degrees, for inducing a depressed mood state and
effects on behaviour congruent with such a state, assessed through activity (speed of
writing, reckoning, etc.), through quantitative and prosodic aspects of speech, through
ability and through motivation in problem-solving and nonverbal communication tasks -not
to mention the effects on memory and recall already referred to.
Our opinion is that the preferred method should be as simple as possible, with the minimum
of intervention and instructions from the experimenter, and as different as possible from
the subsequent tests or tasks. Some methods require that the experimenter, directly or
more subtly, asks the subject to feel sad or happy. This may influence the mood state
self-report that the subject makes subsequently, since it introduces what is known as the
experimental "demand effect, that is, a situation in which the subject may emphasise
that which he/she thinks may please the experimenter (Hulley and Cummings, 1993).
The method of inducing mood states by means of the showing of films with sad or happy
content (or at least with content that is so considered by a majority of viewers) has the
advantage that no special instructions are required that induce a subject to feel
something in particular: participants in the experiment simply watch the films. Moreover,
attention is guaranteed precisely because of the emotional content of the films and, given
that it is visual and auditory material, there is less formal similarity with the memory
tasks, which are based on read and written material.
Our objective is to examine the role of affect in recall bias resulting from mood state,
using a method of nonself-referential induction. Specifically, the method used is the
presentation of audiovisual material with sad or happy content. Our aim is to assess both
the impact of these films on affect and the bias they can induce with regard to selective
recall of emotionally-charged words. If the effect of mood states on selective memory is
mediated by affect, we should find a correlation between magnitude of affective state and
recall bias; in the opposite case no such correlation should exist.
METHOD
Subjects
The initial sample of subjects was made up of 50 student volunteers who received no type
of reward or payment for their participation. One subject was subsequently excluded from
the analysis after obtaining extreme sco
res in the questionnaires assessing symptoms of anxiety and depression. The definitive
sample was made up of 49 subjects, with a mean age of 21.5 years (Confidence Interval (CI)
95%: 20.7 to 22.2 years), of whom 40 were women (CI 95%: 68% to 91%).
Material
The material used in each experimental session included:
- Beck's Depression Inventory, BDI. We used
the Spanish adaptation (Conde and
Useros, 1976). This scale consists of a self-assessment inventory of 21 items, each of
which includes between 4 and 8 manifestations gradated in increasing order of intensity of
depressive symptoms. The items refer to aspects such as mood, pessimism, suicidal desires,
social abandonment, indecision and weight loss, among others.
- State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI-E. We used only the state
form of the Spanish adaptation (Spielber, Gorsuch and Lushene, 1982),
which contains 20 items that measure on a 4point Likert scale (where 0 corresponds to
'none' and 4 to 'high') the general level or general state of anxiety.
- The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List
Revised, MAACL-R (Zuckerman and Lubin, 1985). We used a
translation made by ourselves of the 132 adjectives in the list. There were two versions,
one in the masculine form and another in the feminine, and the adjectives were printed on
a single sheet, in three alphabetically-ordered columns. From this list the subject had to
indicate as many adjectives as he/she wanted that described his/her state at that moment.
The scoring system was much simpler than in the original, given that adjectives were
classified in just two groups: positive, or pleasant, and negative, or unpleasant, and the
number of adjectives from each group marked by each subject was counted. Since the numbers
of adjectives in each group were unequal (72 negative and 60 positive), the number of
adjectives marked by each subject in each group was divided by the number of adjectives in
that group and a corrected score obtained, which was used in all subsequent analyses. As
the scores obtained in this way are not standardised for the Spanish population, the data
have only been used for comparing the responses of subjects participating in this study,
without extrapolating conclusions to the general population.
- Immediate recall test: For this test five different lists were used. These lists
were formed of 7 words whose content evoked positive emotions, 7 words whose content
evoked negative emotions and 7 neutral words, distributed randomly. The presentation of
the lists was made using a slide projector.
- Videotapes with emotional content. This material consisted of: a clip from a Spanish TV
documentary about "child slavery in the
world, of some 15 minutes' duration (this
film was used to induce a negative -depressive or sad- mood in the subjects) and an
excerpt from the Woody Allen film
- "Everything you always wanted to know
about sex (but were afraid to ask), of
similar duration to the other clip, and which was used to induce a positive (euphoric or
happy) mood state. Selection of these materials was made from a list of possible excerpts
with the following characteristics: running time of 10 to 15 minutes, with sad or happy
content (this emotional character being the most salient feature of the excerpt, over and
above informative or other aspects), and suitable for the type of subject participating in
the study. In addition to that of the authors, the opinion was sought of a further
colleague from the faculty who was aware of the study's requirements; the two clips were
chosen unanimously by this selection group.
Procedure
The study was carried out collectively over five scheduled sessions in a lecture room of
the Psychology faculty during teaching hours. Each subject attended a single session
according to his or her timetable. It was attempted to make session numbers as equal as
possible, with the smallest being 7 and the largest 15.
At the beginning of each session subjects were provided with a booklet containing the
questionnaires to be filled out and blank sheets on which to write down the words recalled
in the memory tasks. The material was put in order according to the sequence of the tasks,
and subjects were requested not to look at any of it until they received instructions from
the experimenter.
At the beginning of the session participants were asked to complete the BDI and STAI-E
questionnaires. A first memory task was then administered, consisting in the presentation
of 5 lists of 21 words each (7 with positive emotional valence, 7 with negative valence
and 7 neutral words), projected onto a screen. Viewing time for each list was 30 seconds,
after which 45 seconds were allowed for subjects to write in their booklets as many words
as they remembered from the list. This procedure was repeated for each of the 5 lists.
Once these preliminary tasks had been administered subjects were shown one of the selected
films. The order of presentation of these excerpts was balanced in the different sessions.
In the first, third and fifth sessions the sad sequence was shown first; in the second and
fourth sessions it was the happy film that was shown first. There was no indication that
order of presentation of the clips affected subjects' responses.
Immediately after seeing the film, subjects were administered the MAACL-R adjective task,
indicating which adjectives best described them at that moment. After this adjective task
a second memory test was administered. The same words as used at the beginning of the
session were projected, but distributed randomly in five new lists (which again contained
7 positive, 7 negative and 7 neutral words).
Subsequently, the other film excerpt was shown, and the same steps followed as with the
first excerpt: administration of the MAACL-R and a third memory test, for which 5 further
word lists were drawn up, following the procedure as above.
At the end of this experimental session the subjects were thanked for their participation
and asked not to discuss its content with their colleagues.
RESULTS
Subjects obtained normal scores on the BDI and STAIE questionnaires. 84% of them obtained
a total score on the BDI of 10 points or less, and none scored a total of more than 8
points on the STAI-E. Only in one case was an extreme score found: 18 points on the BDI,
which led to the exclusion of this subject's data from the subsequent analysis.
In the first place it was checked whether the showing of the film clips had been effective
as a procedure for inducing emotions. In order to do this we compared the positive and
negative adjectives from the MAACL-R list that the subjects had marked after watching each
excerpt (see Table 1). The statistical analysis was
carried out through comparison of means with the Student-Fisher t test. The
mean of positive adjectives marked (Row 1) was higher after watching the happy clip than
after the sad one (t=5.10; P<0.0005), and the mean of negative adjectives marked (Row
2) was higher after watching the sad film (t=7.83; P< 0.0005). However, it was also
observed that subjects marked more positive then negative adjectives both after watching
the happy excerpt (column 1: t=10.34; P<0.0005) and after the sad one (column 2:
t=2.28; P=0.027).
To check the assumption that a positive emotional state in subjects favours general
recall, whatever the emotional content of the words, an analysis of variance was carried
out with paired data using the total words recalled at the beginning of the session and
after watching each of the two clips. Results showed that the mean of the total of
recalled words differed between the first stage (beginning of the session), the second and
the third (sad and happy films) (F=235.16; P<0.0005). Comparisons carried out,
corrected in accordance with Bonferroni, indicated that the difference in number of words
recalled for each excerpt (d=18.7-18.4=0.3) was not statistically significant (t=0.68;
P=0.501). However, the total mean number of words recalled before watching either of the
film clips was statistically superior to the mean number of words recalled after seeing
the happy excerpt (d=30.2-18.7=11.5; t=18.2; P<0.0005; CI 95%: 7.25 to 9.05) and the
sad one (d=30.2-18.4=11.8; t=16.28; P<0.0005; CI 95%: 7.35 to 9.42).
Once it had been confirmed that recall of the group of words was not affected by the mood
state induced, the next step was to check the hypothesis that recall of words with
emotional content is favoured if this content is congruent with that of the film presented
immediately before. In order to do this, we carried out a factor analysis of variance with
paired data of the results summarised in Table 2 and
represented in Figure 1. It was
observed that after watching the happy film clip the words with positive emotional content
were those best remembered (F=24.84; P<0.0001). Keeping the type of film constant and
applying the appropriate corrected comparisons it was confirmed that the mean number of
words recalled with positive emotional content was superior to that of recalled words with
negative emotional content (t=2.55; P=0.014) and of recalled neutral words (t=7.74;
P<0.0005), and that the mean number of words recalled with negative emotional content
was superior to that of recalled neutral words (t=4.38, P<0.0005).
After watching the sad clip, the words with negative emotional content were those most
recalled (F=17.34; P<0.0001). The applied comparisons indicated that the mean number of
words with negative emotional content recalled was superior to the mean number of words
with positive emotional content (t=2.55; P=0.014) and neutral words (t=2.89; P=0.006)
recalled, and that the mean number of words with positive emotional content recalled was
superior to that of neutral words recalled (t=7 40; P<0.0005).
Analysing the results obtained at the beginning of the session (before watching the film
clips) it was found that the words with emotional content were better recalled than the
neutral words (F=17.34; P<0.0001). The comparisons applied indicated that the average
number of words with negative emotional content recalled was similar to the mean number of
words with positive emotional content recalled (t=0.12; P=0.90). Similarly, the mean
number of words with positive emotional content recalled was superior to that of neutral
words recalled (t=5.66; P<0.0005), and the mean number of words with negative emotional
content recalled was also superior to that of neutral words recalled (t=11.30;
P<0.00005).
Keeping the emotional content of the words constant, it was observed that there were no
significant differences between the mean numbers of neutral words recalled after each of
the two film clips (t=0.24; P=0.813). However, the mean number of words with positive
emotional recalled was superior after watching the happy film (t=3.78; P<0.0005), and
the mean number of words with negative emotional content recalled was superior after the
sad film (t=2.81; P=0.007). Moreover, it was found that the mean number of words recalled
(whatever their content) was always statistically superior at the beginning of the session
(before watching the films).
A significant interaction was found between the number of positive and negative words
recalled after watching each film clip (t=3.73; P=0.00051).
The following step consisted in examining the relationship between the number of
adjectives marked on the MAACL-R adaptation and the number of positive or negative words
recalled in the memory tests. Although both variables are clearly influenced by the
content of the film clips, there is no appreciable correlation between them (see Table 3).
Finally, with the aim of checking whether prior mood state influenced the results, we
calculated the correlation matrix and the level of bilateral significance of the scores
obtained on the BDI and STAI-E with the rest of the dependent variables. The results were
not significant except in two cases: the number of positive adjectives chosen after
watching the happy film clip presented a negative correlation (r=0.30, P=0.017) with the
score obtained on the BDI, and the number of negative adjectives chosen after watching the
happy film presented a positive correlation (r=0.39, P=0.003) with the score obtained on
the STAI-E.
DISCUSSION
The first result worthy of comment is that each film clip induced a different affective
state. Such a statement is based on the score obtained for the adapted MAACL-R list of
adjectives, from which subjects have to choose words describing their current mood.
Although there is no doubt that subjective expression of mood state was different
after each clip and congruent with their content, it is also true that the intensity of
affect induced by each film, especially the sad one, was no more than moderate, since in
either case the number of positive adjectives marked was superior to the number of
negative adjectives marked. A possible interpretation of this result would be to postulate
that people's neutral or normal state tends more to the positive than the negative, and
that the effect of the sad film would have been, rather than inducing a negative state, to
reduce the magnitude of this supposedly happy or positive normal state. In any case, it
would seem that for the type of subject participating in this study -university students-
it is easier to induce happy mood states than sad ones.
Moving on to analyse the effects on recall of words, we see that the results coincide with
those generally obtained in the literature in this area (Cohen, Eysenck and Levi, 1986). It
seems clear that words with emotional connotations are normally recalled more easily than
neutral ones. We have also seen that the first time the memory test is carried out, recall
is better than the two subsequent times, possibly due to proactive interference, since the
subject is attempting each time to remember the same words but in a different order (Crouse, 1971). Nevertheless, these
differences in recall between the first test and the subsequent ones do not affect the
differential results according to type of film.
Mood state did not influence in an appreciable way the total quantity of recall, but it
did affect the number of emotionally marked words, and this effect was congruent with film
content: whilst in the first test there were no differences between positive or negative
words recalled, after the happy clip more positive than negative words were recalled, with
the opposite effect being observed after the sad clip. Thus, these results confirm the
notion that recall bias produced by congruence between subject's mood state and the
emotional content of words can be observed even though the mood state induced is weak; put
another way, it is not necessary to induce really intense mood states in order to observe
this phenomenon.
If we look at the correlations between number of positive and negative adjectives marked
by subjects and number of positive words and negative words recalled, we see that they
amount to practically nil. This gives greater force to the supposition that they are two
independent effects. It would appear that recall bias does not depend on the subject's
affective experience at time of recall.
These results, taken overall, support the hypothesis of Rholes et al (1987), which assumes
that the effect of mood states on recall, and possibly on other cognitive processes,
depends not on the intensity of the affective experience, but mainly on the cognitive
context activated. The presentation of sad situations appears to facilitate the processing
of information associated with sad situations, without
the subject necessarily feeling particularly sad. Obviously, it must be
recognised that our data does not rule out the role of affect in emotionally intense
situations; rather, it simply demonstrates the possibility of the effect of emotional
situations on cognitive processing irrespective, or relatively independently, of the
emotional or affective experience. That this state has been induced by means of a film,
and with no specific instructions, seems to us to lend greater force and ecological
validity to this result.
The fact that the scores on anxiety and depression influenced the adjectives marked on the
MAACL-R and not the words recalled confirms what has been stated above. Also, this result
is congruent with the fact, already observed in the literature on the topic and mentioned
by Matthews and MacLeod (1994),
that variables of state of an emotional nature influence the link between emotion and
selective processing of information in an interactive way, contributing to the modulation
of the intensity of mood state.
We believe that the data from this study can help to analyse the way people who do not
feel strong affect cope with emotional situations. Attempts have been made to explain this
type of reaction through various concepts, such as repression (Byrne, 1964), avoidance (Krohne, 1993) or alexitimia (Martínez Sánchez, 1995), which,
while differing among themselves, have in common the notion of the absence of the
experience and expression of emotions in situations that require them. It is clear, too,
that this absence of affect is of decisive importance in the process of coping with
situations of stress. In our case it has been demonstrated that normal subjects can think
as though they were sad without feeling especially sad. Applying this possibility to
people who do not express affect, or do not feel it in manifestly emotional situations,
our data opens the door to the idea that blocking out the perception of one's own mood
state or its expression does not necessarily imply also blocking out the cognitive effects
of 'sad' situations of threat or failure, and contributes to the search for ways of
assessing emotional impact independently of the affective experience.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study was carried out with the help of research grant PB94-0700 from the CICYT. The
authors would like to thank Xavier Cahiuelas for his collaboration in the collection of
data.
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Table 3. Correlations between scores on the adapted MAACL-R (Adjectives)
and number of words remembered: correlation coefficient (significance level). |
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